GuideSignals

    UWB vs BLE for indoor ranging: 802.15.4z, Bluetooth Channel Sounding and Wi-Fi RTT compared

    Short answer

    UWB measures time of flight with very short pulses and IEEE 802.15.4z protects the timestamps with a scrambled timestamp sequence; Android's documentation speaks of an accuracy of 10 cm, the finest figure among the sources here. Bluetooth RSSI only guesses distance from signal strength. Bluetooth 6.0 Channel Sounding adds phase-based ranging and round-trip timing with built-in attack detection, on the Bluetooth radio, but needs new chips on both ends. Wi-Fi RTT reuses Wi-Fi access points at about 1 to 2 meters. Choose by the accuracy you must prove, the attacks you must stop and what sits on both ends.

    Compared

    Four ways to measure distance indoors

    Indoor ranging options
    UWB (IEEE 802.15.4z)Bluetooth Channel SoundingBluetooth RSSIWi-Fi RTT (802.11mc / az)
    How it measuresTime of flight of short pulsesPhase at many frequencies (phase-based ranging) and round-trip timing, alone or combinedReceived signal strengthRound-trip time of Wi-Fi frames
    What the source says on accuracy"an accuracy of 10 cm" (Android developers)"significantly more accurate" than path loss; no figure (Bluetooth SIG)Path loss estimate only"typically accurate within 1-2 meters" with three or more access points (Android developers)
    ProtectionScrambled timestamp sequence (STS) in HRP modePBR and RTT cross-check, randomised bits and timing, attack detection metricNone in the measurementSecure LTF in 802.11az
    PhonesiPhone 11 and later; Android 12 and later with UWB hardwareNeeds Bluetooth 6.0 Channel Sounding chips on both endsAllAndroid 9 and later; Android 15 for 802.11az
    Other endUWB tag or anchor, FiRa compliant for AndroidChannel Sounding capable deviceAny Bluetooth LE deviceAccess points with FTM

    UWB: time of flight with protected timestamps

    UWB sends pulses spread over a very wide band, so the receiver can time their arrival precisely. IEEE 802.15.4z-2020 added the scrambled timestamp sequence (STS) in high rate pulse repetition (HRP) mode: an encrypted waveform that only the two parties can predict, which makes it hard to fake or advance a timestamp. A 2024 IEEE Security and Privacy paper by Luo and co-authors shows that secure ranging with STS is achievable, but only with an adequate receiver design, and that earlier receivers had vulnerabilities. In practice that means choosing chips and firmware with a known security analysis.

    On phones, Apple's Nearby Interaction gives distance and direction in the foreground and works with third-party accessories built to its accessory protocol. Android exposes UWB only through the Jetpack androidx.core.uwb library on Android 12 and later; provisioned STS, the stronger key option, needs Android 14. In the EU, UWB use is harmonised by Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/785.

    Bluetooth: from RSSI to Channel Sounding

    Classic Bluetooth proximity uses RSSI: the weaker the signal, the farther the device is assumed to be. Bodies, walls, antenna orientation and the device's own transmit power all change RSSI, so it suits "near or far", not distances you have to prove, and anyone who relays or amplifies the signal changes the answer.

    Bluetooth Core 6.0, announced in September 2024, adds Channel Sounding. It measures phase on up to 72 channels, each 1 MHz wide (phase-based ranging), and the round-trip time of packets; the two can be used alone or together, and round-trip timing resolves the phase method's ambiguity, which the SIG says does not arise until around 150 meters. Against attacks it cross-checks both methods, randomises bits and timing from a shared random bit generator, and reports a Normalized Attack Detector Metric from "extremely unlikely" to "extremely likely". The SIG's overview gives no accuracy figure, so treat vendor numbers as claims to test.

    Where Wi-Fi RTT fits

    Wi-Fi RTT uses access points that may already be in the building. Android's documentation gives 1 to 2 meters from three or more access points, and 802.11az adds Secure LTF against spoofing. It needs access points with FTM and suits positioning a phone in a building more than ranging between two small devices. Our Wi-Fi sensing guide covers FTM and CSI in detail.

    How to choose

    • You must prove a distance, and someone gains by faking it. UWB with STS, or Channel Sounding, with relay and replay attacks in the threat model and tested.
    • Both ends are your hardware. You choose freely; compare UWB and Channel Sounding chips against the same acceptance plan.
    • One end is the user's phone. UWB works on recent iPhones and on Android phones with UWB hardware; Channel Sounding needs phones with Bluetooth 6.0 Channel Sounding support. Check your users' phones.
    • Near or far is enough. Bluetooth RSSI is cheap and everywhere, as long as nobody gains by cheating.
    • The building already has Wi-Fi. Wi-Fi RTT can position phones without new infrastructure, if the access points support FTM.

    Many products combine radios: Bluetooth for discovery and the parameter exchange, UWB or Channel Sounding for the distance, and signatures on every result so the record holds up later.

    Test before you commit

    • Write the accuracy the product needs and the pass line before testing.
    • Use several units of each chip and phone model; offsets differ per unit.
    • Test the rooms and materials of real use, with and without line of sight.
    • Run the attacks in your threat model: relay, replay, signal amplification.
    • Measure power draw and update rate, not only accuracy.

    How we work with this

    Our R&D team tests UWB, BLE, Wi-Fi RTT, Wi-Fi CSI, LTE and mmWave radar in our own hardware lab, each against a written acceptance plan, and builds the option that passes into Rust firmware with Ed25519 on every message and a threat model written before the code. See signals and sensing, or start with a feasibility study or a proof of concept.

    FAQ

    Q01Is UWB always more accurate than Bluetooth?

    Against RSSI, yes: RSSI only estimates distance from signal strength. Against Bluetooth Channel Sounding the answer depends on the chips, the antennas and the room, and the Bluetooth SIG publishes no accuracy figure for it in its Core 6.0 overview. Test both against the same acceptance plan.

    Q02Do phones support UWB?

    iPhone 11 and later and UWB-capable Apple Watch models through Apple's Nearby Interaction framework, which also talks to third-party accessories since iOS 15. Android 12 and later on devices with UWB hardware, through the Jetpack androidx.core.uwb library; IoT devices must be FiRa MAC 1.3 compliant.

    Q03Why do UWB products still need Bluetooth?

    Both sides must agree on ranging parameters (addresses, channel, session key) before UWB ranging starts. Android leaves this exchange to the app over a secure out-of-band channel, with Bluetooth Low Energy as the usual choice, and Apple's accessory flow starts from a data link too.

    Q04Can ranging be spoofed?

    RSSI can, by amplifying or relaying a signal. UWB in IEEE 802.15.4z adds the scrambled timestamp sequence (STS), Bluetooth Channel Sounding cross-checks two methods and randomises its signals, and Wi-Fi 802.11az adds Secure LTF. Research on 802.15.4z shows the receiver design still decides whether the protection holds, so put attacks in the threat model and test them.

    Sources

    This guide summarises public standards and vendor documentation for engineering teams. Figures are the sources' own, not our measurements. Check current chip and phone support with your vendors.

    Next step

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    Oleg Pun

    CEO, Vareger

    Oleg Pun, CEO, Vareger