Devices that prove where they are
- Problem
- Signed proof of physical presence that nobody can fake.
- Built
- Rust firmware on ESP32-C6, radio lab research, signed proofs.
We write firmware and the software around hardware: Rust firmware for ESP32-C6 with radio ranging and live tuning, research in our own hardware lab across Wi-Fi RTT, UWB, BLE, LTE, mmWave radar and Wi-Fi CSI, signed device messages and over-the-air updates, field apps that control machines over their own Wi-Fi, and GPU image processing for super-resolution microscopes.
| Firmware | Rust 2024 · ESP32-C6 · no unsafe in shared crates |
|---|---|
| Radios | Wi-Fi FTM/RTT · UWB · BLE · LTE · mmWave · CSI |
| Security | Ed25519 · threat model first · SBOM |
| Instruments | C++ · CUDA · camera and stage control |
How a project runs
| Rust firmware | Firmware in Rust for ESP32-C6 with a seven-step Wi-Fi FTM accuracy pipeline, live tuning over MQTT, per-device calibration and over-the-air updates. | |
|---|---|---|
| Radio and sensing research | Our own hardware lab tests Wi-Fi RTT, UWB, BLE, LTE, mmWave radar and Wi-Fi CSI, each against a written acceptance plan; pose and activity models trained on mmWave point clouds. | |
| Device security | Ed25519 on every message, signed multi-party proofs with witness quorums, a threat model before code (relay, Sybil, replay, clock skew), cargo-audit, cargo-deny and SBOMs, ready for the Cyber Resilience Act. | |
| Hardware assembly and control apps | We assembled a liquid fertiliser sprayer around the client's controller and built the Android app that runs it in the field over the machine's own Wi-Fi: live telemetry, automatic, test and manual modes, and console commands to the controller. | |
| Instrument software | Continuous scanning with the camera shooting on the move, multithreaded GPU image processing in C++ and CUDA, and support for a new light source, focusing system, stage controller and confocal imager. | |
| Device to ledger | Signed evidence from devices through verifiers and a witness quorum to a blockchain record, so nobody can fake where a device was. |
Stack
Proof
FAQ
Memory safety without a garbage collector, a strong type system for protocol code, and tooling (cargo-audit, cargo-deny, SBOM generation) that makes security reviews and Cyber Resilience Act evidence easier.
Yes. We test radios and sensors in our own hardware lab, each against a written acceptance plan, before the design goes into firmware.
Yes. We have built apps and services against existing controllers, for example a fertiliser sprayer we assembled and the field app that drives it over the machine's own Wi-Fi.
We build the whole line: firmware, the services that verify and store device data, and where needed a ledger that keeps the record.
Next step
A 30 minute call with Mykhailo. You leave with a clear view of scope, risks and next step.
Mykhailo Tiutin
CTO, Vareger
